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TOWARD A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY IN ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
ABSTRACT
This paper suggests that strategy research should move beyond a neo-Hobbesian approach to
contracting toward a new social contract approach. Work from an agency theory perspective has
generated utilitarian insights, but its description of agent behavior is too limited and its assumptions
are not a useful guide to productive alliances among firms. Altruism, ethics, goodwill, moral
sentiments, and trust need to be placed in the foreground of our vision and society must be seen as
the ultimate principal to which both individuals and firms are responsible.
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A neo-Hobbesian perspective permeates the economics literature. The emphasis on
uncertainty and measurement (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Barzel, 1982; Eisenhardt, 1985) as critical
variables for predicting how both interfirm and intrafirm transactions will be governed can ultimately
be traced back to the assumption that some people behave opportunistically. According to
Williamson: "opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially
to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse" (1985, p. 47). The
assumption of opportunism can be found in agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling,
1976), transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1985), self-enforcing agreements (Telser, 1980), game-
theoretic reputation models and narrow economic (functionalist) definitions of organizational culture
and trust (Camerer & Vepsalainen, 1988; Kreps, 1990). It is possible to make the devil an honest
man in these works, because it pays to be honest under certain conditions. "Calculative trust",
however, is a contradiction in terms (see also Williamson, 1992). A broader view of trust and human
behavior is required.
In this paper, trust is defined as an expectation that alleviates the fear that one's exchange
partner will act opportunistically (Bradach & Eccles, 1989). Trust is characterized by a cognitive
"leap of faith" that reason alone would not anticipate. Even though opportunism is possible, trust
prevails. While not totally justifiable or groundable, trust is nonetheless generated and sustained.
Broadening the scope of assumed behavior to include trustworthy conduct has several
beneficial consequences. First, a broader perspective suggests new solutions for the problems of
incomplete planning, monitoring costs, enforcement costs and dispute settlement that have benefits for
both internal and external transactions. Second, a more balanced view of human motivation reunites
the strategy field with the field of ethics. We will argue that these two benefits have special relevance
for understanding alliance as a strategic option.
1
Economic Approaches to Contracting and their Limits
In the absence of opportunism and measurement problems the contractual hazards of "small-
numbers bargaining" (e.g., contracting when specialized assets are involved) would disappear.
Consider situations which involve imperfect measurement of individual output, the "nonseparabilities
problem." Alchian & Demsetz (1972) provide the example of two men loading freight onto a truck.
Since observation of the outcome (i.e., the amount of freight loaded at the end of the day) is not
sufficient for ascertaining individual productivity, the "classical capitalist firm" and the "manager as
monitor" are proposed as solutions to the possibility of shirking or free-riding. Clearly, the
measurement problem is intertwined with problems of anticipated opportunism by individual workers
whose contribution to total output can not be individually identified. But the neo-Hobbesian approach
of organizational economics, with its emphasis on agent self-interest, may lead to monitoring with
excessive zeal. Given the long association of strategic management with those who study "human
relations" (Dalton, 1959; Mayo, 1945), we should know better. It is a rudimentary management
principle that excessive monitoring reduces productivity.
From a neo-Hobbesian perspective, situations in which highly specialized assets are being
exchanged in an on-going contractual relationship among firms (Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978;
Walker & Weber, 1987; Williamson, 1985), are subject to even greater problems than intra-firm
contractual agreements. When such exchanges involve bilateral monopoly, they are risky to
undertake by definition, because each party runs the risk of being "held-up". The amount that a party
could theoretically appropriate is the difference between the first-best value and the second-best value
of the asset — the so-called "quasi-rent". The contractual problems between Fisher-Body and General
Motors that ensued once the dies were cast are illustrative, and economists suggest that the eventual
merger of Fisher-Body and General Motors was to avoid the contractual incentives to
opportunistically appropriate available quasi-rents (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978).
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The solution offered by economists to interorganizational contractual hazards such as
imperfect measurement and asset specificity once again boils down to the idea that the firm can
mitigate opportunism through incentives, improved monitoring, increased auditing capabilities, and
more-refined compensation and dispute-settling mechanisms. The firm thus reduces opportunism at a
cost. The alternative strategy of transferring transactions out of the market into the firm reduces
various transaction costs, but is attended by a loss of "high-powered" incentives (Williamson, 1985,
chapter 6).
Broadening the scope of relationships to the difficult field of strategic alliances (Borys &
Jemison, 1989) exacerbates these dilemmas. The problem of interfirm cooperation from transaction
costs theory and related perspectives is that alliances take place in a complex environment that
precludes the possibility of writing a comprehensive agreement (Williamson, 1975). Real-world
coordination difficulties between heterogeneous firms that possess differentiated products, dissimilar
production processes, varied financial strategies and organizational structures make complete planning
unattainable. The implementation of contractual agreements between firms requires high monitoring
costs that can easily dissipate benefits, and enforcement costs are often greater than anticipated with
costly court disputes between firms when unforseen outcomes occur.
It has been argued that these problems are so strong in the case of interfirm alliances, that the
solutions of classic industrial economics (Scherer & Ross, 1990) are insufficient. Williamson (1985)
and others (Hennart, 1982; Walker & Weber, 1987) provide a persuasive case that internalization
(e.g., internal growth, acquisition, merger) is required to overcome the contractual hazards involved
in interfirm agreements. Internalization is favored on the grounds of incentive, adaptability,
monitoring, reward-refining and dispute-settling capabilities of firms in comparison to contractual
arrangements.
Broadening the scope still farther to encompass contractual relationships between firms and
states, we find similar problems of the state "monitoring with excessive zeal." Furthermore, there
are no restraints on opportunistic behaviors not specifically controlled by contract ~ extreme forms of
exploitation that endanger the life chances of citizens coming in contact with the firm can result,
including environmental degradation and hazardous working conditions (e.g., see Manville
Corporation, Chapter 35 in Snyder, Rowe, Mason & Dickel, 1991).
Even in economic models, opportunism is not the only behavior possible. Empirical evidence
shows that cooperation is often found in non-repeated games (Sen, 1987), and is even more likely to
emerge among self-interested agents in iterated games (Axelrod, 1984). Cooperation is also more
likely to occur when knowledge is imperfect, e.g., when cost characteristics of rival firms are not
known, or when the game has an indefinite end (Sen, 1987).
We argue in this paper, however, that cooperative behavior can have a quite different
explanation than that of the "calculative self-interested man." Egoistic incentives (reputation,
reciprocity) are not necessary to create cooperation and altruism (Etzioni, 1988). In fact, examples of
unselfish acts are ubiquitous. Long ago, Kropotkin (1924) pointed out the vast amount of mutual aid
given in times of need. Etzioni (1988, pp. 52-66) gives more recent evidence of the existence of
altruistic behavior; people mail back lost wallets, donate blood and bone marrow to strangers, support
public television, and vote, despite the incentive to "free-ride". We in strategy need to keep in mind
that managers and workers similarly do not regard transactions in a strictly neutral and instrumental
way. Workers feel commitment to their employers; sales people track down needed information over
their lunch hour; managers initiate activities without salary incentives. In short, our experience
supports a wider view of human behavior than is assumed in a number of the theories that currently
dominate strategy research.
Research along the lines of the neo-Hobbesian approach is certainly relevant to strategic
management as a scientific and pragmatic field (Barney, 1990; Mahoney, 1992), but broader
assumptions are desperately needed. We are particularly concerned that most business students are
not instructed carefully on the distinction between an empirical claim and a simplifying premise
(Bowie, 1991). The egoistic assumption within agency theory allows for parsimonious models and
predictive power. However, egoism is not scientifically established as a universal fact of human
nature. This distinction should be emphasized to business students, and both students and theorists
need to consider the implications of more realistically portraying human actors. Basing the entire
field of strategic management on an allegory of self-interest is an unreflective story; it does not reflect
the range of our experience and (we will argue) it helps enact a world not worth living in.
Reification of the Mistaken Foundations of Economic Theory
It is quite ironic that overzealous admirers of the premise of self-interest have made Adam
Smith their "guru". A passage written over 1 10 years ago is still apposite:
The isolation of the theory of political economy is peculiar to our own day.
In more recent times, we find this study confounded with the other moral
sciences, of which it was an integral part. When the genius of Adam Smith
gave [economics] a distinct character, he did not desire to separate it from
those branches of knowledge without which it could only remain a bleached
plant from the absence of the sunlight of ethics. (Wolowski, 1882, p. 23)
Smith (1790) actually champions benevolence, sympathy, and moral sentiments in his writing,
though this emphasis tends to be lost in quotations by modern economists and business scholars (for
exceptions see Coase, 1976 and Viner, 1991). Sen (1987) notes, for example, that Smith chastised
Epicurus for trying to reduce everything to one motivation:
By running up all the different virtues, too, to this one species of propriety,
Epicurus indulged a propensity, which is natural to all men, but which
philosophers in particular are apt to cultivate with a particular fondness, as the
great means of displaying their ingenuity, — the propensity to account for all
appearances from as few principles as possible (Smith, 1790, p. 474).
Many modern economists have similarly ignored the human breadth Smith recognized, using
him instead as the foundation for narrow assumptions about human behavior. Solow's observation is
that:
There is an important element of sheer daredevil athleticism in the attachment
of economists ... to the model of greed and rationality. 'Show me anything,
anything, and I will produce a model that derives it from greed and
rationality.' 1 (1991, p.6).
McPherson is perplexed by the same behavior: "What is odd ... is the desire to derive everything
from self-interest as if that were a natural or necessary starting point. It is a peculiar feature of the
sociology of the present-day economics profession that this odd ambition should be so prevalent"
(1984, pp. 77-78). In fact, Etzioni (1988) reminds us that efforts to explain away altruism have been
advanced since the ancient Greeks. It seems that each generation must answer the challenge anew.
It is a particularly important time for U.S. business schools to reconsider the intellectual basis
of our research and teaching. Mitchell and Scott (1990) forcefully argue that the ethic of self-
interested, outcome-oriented individualism is a contributing factor of American decay. American
leaders' lack of stewardship and management abuses of trust have had a devastating effect on
American productivity. Productivity and trust are in fact inextricably linked (Ouchi, 1981), as
forcefully explained by Arrow:
Now trust has a very important pragmatic value, if nothing else. Trust is an
important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot
of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's word.
Unfortunately this is not a commodity which can be bought very easily. If
you have to buy it, you already have some doubts about what you've bought.
Trust and similar values, loyalty, or truthtelling are examples of what an
economist would call 'externalities'. They are goods, they are commodities;
they have real practical value; they increase the efficiency of the system,
enable you to produce more goods or more of whatever values you hold in
1 Allison refers to this as the "'Rationality Theorem': there exists no pattern of activity for which an
imaginative analyst cannot write a large number of objective functions such that the pattern of activity maximizes
each function" (1971, p. 35).
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high esteem. But they are not commodities, for which trade on the open
market is technically possible or even meaningful (1974, p. 23).
The theoretical argument here is that high performance does not require a focus on opportunistic
behavior. Stakeholders can see corporate social responsibility as indicating management skill
(Freeman, 1984), and firms have an investment in reputation, including the reputation for being
socially responsible (Bowman & Haire, 1975; Gatewood & Carroll, 1991; Wood, 1991). Nor is it
necessary to argue that apparently altruistic behavior must under closer scrutiny be revealed as
reflecting egoistic motives (Piliavin & Charng, 1990).
The critical importance of going beyond classic economic assumptions is that: "The more
people accept the neoclassical paradigm (of economists) as a guide for their behavior, the more
the ability to sustain a market economy is undermined" (Etzioni, 1988, p. 250). If all people
behaved in the calculative, self-seeking manner described in economic theory, the market economy
would collapse (Arrow, 1974). Frank argues, for example, that:
our beliefs about human nature help shape human nature itself. What
we think about ourselves and our possibilities determines what we
aspire to become; and it shapes what we teach our children, both at
home and in the schools. Here the pernicious effects of the self-
interest theory has been most disturbing (1988, p. xi).
Macneil (1980) also takes issue with agency theory's quest for a non-institutional, non-
contextual, ahistorical explanation of contract, a criticism that has also been articulated in the
management literature by Eisenhardt (1989), and in the economics literature by Coase, who chastises
modern "blackboard economics" because:
Exchange takes place without any specification of its institutional
setting. We have consumers without humanity, firms without
organization, and even exchange without markets (1988, p. 3).
The alternative Macneil describes is a new social contract approach, which can be integrated
into the "conversation of mankind" (Habermas, 1979; Kahn, 1990; Mahoney, 1993; McCloskey,
1985; Oakeshott, 1962; Rorty, 1979). The contract continues to be the important means of
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"projecting exchange into the future" (1980, p.5) in this much broader perspective on human activity.
Macneil's view is new , however, in that it is neither the neoclassical contract of positive economics
nor the contract of law. The new social contract approach assumes that "actors pursue two or more
goals (utilities): (they) seek pleasure (and hence self-interest), and seek to abide by their moral
commitments" (Etzioni, 1988, p. 254). The emphasis of this new view is not on individual actions,
however, but on the social setting2 . It is only in a social context that one actor can trust another to
abide by moral commitments, a trust that leads to a satisfying exchange relationship. The social
relationship is thus the institution which must be society's basic socioeconomic tool.
In this paper, we champion the new social contract approach as a means of uniting strategic
management, organizational economics, law and ethics. As the strategy field matures, we have
additional capacity to speak in these broader terms. As the economy globalizes and reaches more
deeply into human life it is increasingly important that we do so.
Impediments to a Broadened Ethical Agenda
Before considering the new social contract approach we pose the following question: If the
attenuation of opportunism and the development of business ethics is at the heart of strategic
management problems, then why are they not discussed more in our research and teaching? The
answer is that one of the more damaging by-products of logical positivism and the empiricist
movement is the assumption that ethical propositions lie outside the purview of science. For some
time we have been in the position that social scientists may rationally discuss "means" but not "ends".
2 While our main argument is that the social setting informs the study of institutions, we acknowledge
that institutional economics also informs our understanding of the social setting. Institutions make people
more confident that they can use trust and ethics as alternative ways to structure relationships (Shapiro,
1987; Zucker, 1986). We thank Tom Roehl for this observation.
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However, pragmatic philosophers such as Emerson and Dewey soundly reject the Cartesian
dualism of ends and means. Dewey (1929) suggests instead a means-ends continuum: we climb a
peak only to find other peaks beyond us; no matter when we stop our Sisyphean climb, other peaks
remain beyond. Adopting a similar point of view, Emerson wrote:
Causes and effect, means and ends, seed and fruit cannot be severed;
for the effect already blooms in the cause, the end preexists in the
means, the fruit in the seed. (Quote from Bourgeois, 1984, p. 594).
These philosophical arguments from the beginning of the century are more and more compatible with
our globalizing world at the end of the century. Accepting a pragmatic perspective, the key to
strategic management must be the journey more than the destination. We must become far more
concerned with means than we have been in the past, recognizing the temporal brevity of the ends we
can envision.
Without debating here whether it is proper for business school researchers to examine the
more philosophical aspects of ethical theory, we do claim that greater attention to the means of
conducting business involves "practical" business ethics (Arthur, 1984). Conversation that discusses
the criteria that are used in evaluating management-environment interactions on some scale of
goodness or badness is inescapable. It is apparent that many academics at present question whether
ethics, even in this restricted sense, is a proper subject for strategic management. Our argument is
that the ethical beliefs and the ethical practices of managers and workers are part of the data that must
be considered in strategy research. What constitutes a "fair employer" is as much a variable of
business as is the entropy measure of related diversification.
Positivist philosophers were wrong in asserting that all ethical propositions are meaningless
(Sen, 1987), and their legacy has negatively affected strategy research. Every practical ethical
problem of the business community is a problem in strategic management research. The strategic
management researcher and the executive of a company each have an unavoidable role as "moralist" -
- not merely as a describer of moral ideas and ideals, but as the creator and propagator of ideas and
ideals, seeking not merely to describe but to change (Boulding, 1953; Schumacher, 1973).
The suppression of normative values may be deemed as "good" by some researchers, but this
stance rests on a normative value as well. Myrdal (1970) argues against suppressing value judgments
in the interests of science. He also rejects the sharp distinction made between positive and normative
theory. His solution to the concerns expressed by positivists and those they have influenced is to
suggest that the scientist boldly declare value judgments at the outset of the analysis:
There is no other device for excluding biases in social sciences than to face
the valuations and to introduce them as explicitly stated, specific, and
sufficiently concretized value premises. ...Emotion and irrationality in science
... acquire their high potency precisely when valuations are kept suppressed or -
remain concealed in the so-called 'facts' (1944, pp. 1043-1044).
Our argument, to summarize, is that the subject of strategy is intrinsically ethical, which
makes research that sidesteps ethics problematic (Nelson, 1991). Anyone who suggests that the best
direction for strategic management is toward "disinterested social science" is advocating both an
unattainable goal and an unprofitable journey. No such social science is humanly possible. As
Giddens notes: "The theories and findings of the social sciences cannot be kept wholly separate from
the universe of meaning and action which they are about" (1984, p. xxxiii). We can make our
strategy conversation more rational only by facing our valuations, not by evading them. To have
evaluation, we cannot eliminate valuation.
A strategy researcher who is writing about important problems thus is writing about things
which are of necessity highly charged with moral content. Boulding (1953) contends that most
influential writers in social science have been "moralists" (e.g., Adam Smith, Marx, Freud). They
knew what they liked and especially what they didn't like, and they had no hesitation in giving their
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work a persuasive tone. In this spirit, we agree with Freeman and Gilbert that: "We must put ethics
in its rightful place at the very center of discussions about corporate strategy" (1988, p. 7).
Basic Precepts of a New Approach to Social Contracts
Arguments for the importance of ethics in strategy research are not new. A narrow economic
view of managerial obligations (Friedman, 1962) is rejected emphatically by Andrews, who regards
coming to terms with the morality of choice as perhaps the most strenuous undertaking in strategic
management (1980, p. 89). The "Harvard School" also has long argued for a broad definition of
strategy that includes "the kind of economic and human organization (the company) is or intends to
be, and the nature of the economic and noneconomic contribution it intends to make to its
shareholders, employees, customers and communities" (1980, p. 18). Recent trends, however, have
moved many strategy researchers away from these perspectives toward definitions that are more
tractable for empirical research and theoretical modeling.
In trying to reassert the importance of a broad, socially connected definition of strategy for
empirical and theoretical work, we find Macneil's commentary on the basis for a "New Social
Contract" to be particularly insightful:
The fundamental root, the base, of contract is society. Never has contract
occurred without society; never will it occur without society; and never can its
functioning be understood isolated from its particular society. (1980, p. 1-2)
The implication is that businesses are inextricably bound to each other in a complex web of ongoing
interdependencies that would not be possible outside the confines of society.
In many ways the problem of understanding the firm's place in its historical, institutional,
social context is analogous to Rousseau's original arguments about the social contract over two
centuries ago:
The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and
protect with the whole common force the person and the goods of
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each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may
still obey himself alone and remain as free as before [i.e., in the
original state of nature] (1952 [original 1762], p. 391)
What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an
unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting;
what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he
possesses. (1952, p. 393)
The relevant scope of social contracts today involves a complex three cornered set of
relationships, outlined by Stopford and Strange (1991) and by Dicken (1993). There is mutual
dependence among firms, among states, and between firms and states. In addition to these relations
among corporate bodies, are the relationships between individual actors and the firm and the state.
Although changing state-state, firm-state, and individual-state relations are of vital importance to
business concerns, in outlining the emerging elements of a new social contract our focus will be on
individual-firm and firm-firm relations. The general outline of the social contract between businesses
and individuals, we argue, is no different from Rousseau's original outline, substituting "the firm" for
the pre-feminist use of "man":
The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very
remarkable change in [the firm], by substituting justice for instinct in
[its] conduct, and giving [its] actions the morality they had formerly
lacked. Then only, when the voice of duty takes the place of physical
impulses and right of appetite, does [the firm, which] so far had
considered only [itself], find that [it] is forced to act on different
principles, and to consult ... reason before listening to ... instincts.
(1952: 393)
In fact, each individual [firm] may have a particular will contrary or
dissimilar to the general will which [it] has as a citizen. [Its]
particular interest may speak ... quite differently from the common
interest: [its] absolute and naturally independent existence may make
[it] look upon what [it] owes to the common cause as a gratuitous
contribution, the loss of which will do less harm to others than the
payment of it is burdensome to [itself], and [thus] ... [the firm] may
wish to enjoy the rights of citizenship without being ready to fulfill the
duties of a subject. The continuance of such an injustice could not but
prove the undoing of the body politic. (1952, p. 393, emphasis
added)
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The message is clear: The rights and benefits of participation in the socio-economic context
rest on fulfilling the responsibilities of being a part of that context. Similarly, the quid pro quo of
organizational involvement is the partial subjugation of individual will. The individual worker must
sacrifice immediate self-interest in order to coordinate with others (Barnard, 1938); the manager must
be able to articulate a general vision that inspires this subordination of individual will (Barnard, 1938;
Simon, 1945; Ulrich & Lake, 1990). Unfortunately, we are in danger of coming to believe recent
models of egoistic and atomistic behavior and we are now proceeding to enact a world in accordance
with these models - an amoral world of the "rights of appetite" not worth living in over the short
term and unsustainable in the long term.
The "new social contract" that informs and transforms the strategic behaviors/actions of
businesses into sustainable, and sustaining entities must take into account emerging changes in the
way business is being done in today's world. Complex relational networks (Dicken 1993) within and
between firms with an emphasis on flexibility, responsiveness, and innovation call forth modern
contractual relations (Macneil 1980). Modern contractual relations recognize that in addition to
short term discrete contracts, business is involved in a mixture of long term arrangements and
agreements, that arise from and depend upon myriad subjective, context dependent, and non-
transferable personal relations.
Five precepts form the basis for the new social contracts required to govern these links.
1) Recognition of unity : Macneil (1980) suggests that in a world of stakeholders and
constituencies, all the complex economic actors of Adam Smith's Moral Sentiments provide a better
story than the simplistic view of principals and agents locked in a world of individual self-interest.
Once we relinquish a blackboard world of two dimensional "economic men", recognition of
connection becomes vital. In a world of increased interdependence:
One flat tire on a busy superhighway and traffic can be blocked for miles; one
defective bolt and an airliner crashes; a gasoline shortage - shortage, mind
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you, not stoppage — and the whole national economy is thrown into turmoil
(Macneil, 1980, p. 104).
With changes in the world economy we must recognize the detrimental effects of "us versus
them" thinking that pervades the world of agency theory and perceived zero-sum games; we must, in
particular, redefine the boundaries of care. Boulding notes that "almost every organization ...
exhibits two faces — a smiling face which it turns toward its members and a frowning face which it
turns to the world outside" (1953, p. 10), but this distinction will be increasingly difficult to maintain:
As competition becomes keener we need to remind ourselves and
colleagues that management is not a gladiatorial contest, it is rather a
process which tries to ensure that all involved -- customers, suppliers,
sub-contractors, agents, employees, shareholders — are satisfied
(Davis, 1991, p. 101).
In his book The Greening of America. Reich argues more broadly for nothing less than the goal of
"species solidarity" (1971, p.419) where harmony is maintained between individual freedom and
social consciousness. This is the humanist's perspective (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 3 15; Zald,
1993). From this perspective, lack of social consciousness can be shown to generate distinct
economic loss as well as the loss of essential human qualities.
2) Convergent expectations : The sociologist Durkheim (1933) anticipates Boulding's (1953)
internal/external distinction by using the terms "mechanical solidarity" (solidarity of likes; more likely
to be found intrafirm) and "organic solidarity" (solidarity of unlikes, the task now required for
interfirm cooperation). Solidarity is difficult to achieve in a world in which respect for the individual
is fragile and perishable (Rorty, 1989); it ultimately hangs by the narrow thread of "convergent
expectations" (Arrow, 1974).
The convergence that makes an intellectually understood commonality real are not easy to
understand or influence. Long ago Chester Barnard noted that: "Inspiration is necessary to inculcate
a sense of unity, and to create common ideals. Emotion rather than intellectual acceptance is
required" (1938, p. 293). Ultimately, "the social solidarity making exchange work" (Macneil, 1980,
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p. 14) is derived from the "complex webs of interdependence created by the relation itself (Macneil,
1980, p. 23).
Work on culture and the possibility of positively affecting culture3 is especially useful here.
Culture can be defined as an interdependent set of socially acquired shared understandings, values,
ideologies, tacit knowledge, metaphors, stories, specialized language, socialization, myths, symbols,
rituals, organizational routines, and systems of belief (Geertz, 1973; O'Reilly, 1989; Pettigrew, 1979;
Polanyi, 1958; Wiener, 1988). A strong culture involves the penetration and cohesion of this
interdependent set at the sociological, psychological, artificial (e.g., routines and structures) and
historical levels (Saffold, 1988; Schein, 1985).
Organizational culture displays both spontaneous and intentional features (Williamson, 1992),
and is driven both by intended strategy and emergent strategy (Barney, 1986; Gordon, 1991). Within
the firm, culture can be thought of as an emergent process that has as its source a set of deep
underlying values (Smircich, 1983). However, in another sense, culture is pragmatically manageable
(Van Cauwenbergh & Cool, 1982; Deal & Kennedy, 1982). Intended strategy, for example, may
involve the creation of symbols, the management of shared organizational values and the corporate
identification process (Trice & Beyer, 1991, 1993).
Organizational culture rarely reaches the depth and richness of anthropological cultures
(Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984) and thus may be more adaptive and more easily developed than one would
expect given the anthropological metaphor (Wilkins & Dyer, 1988; Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983). The
new social contract perspective asserts, however, the importance of attempting to influence culture
capable of transcending not only specific organizations, but nation, religion, race and first-hand
experience. As our economic and social interactions become increasingly global, we must develop a
3 Useful taxonomies of schools of thought in cultural anthropology and organizational culture may be
found in Allaire and Firsirotu (1984) and Smircich (1983).
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sense of the global society to which we increasingly belong. This sense of the whole must be
expressed in convergent expectations -- a narrow thread that can be profoundly influenced by intra
and interfirm relationships. To the extent supplying a satisfying exchange relation becomes a part of
the strategic management agenda, the possibility of future unity is increased. The "atmosphere"
surrounding a transaction (Williamson, 1975) is thus of increasing importance; the exchange process
itself must be made an object of value (Knight, 1921).
3) Commitment over Time : Durkheim (1933) suggests that organic solidarity may ultimately
be ungroundable, or based on the flimsiest of grounds and yet continues to exist. Similar themes may
be found in philosophy (Rorty, 1989), economics (Arrow, 1974), law (Macneil, 1986) and
organization theory (Ouchi, 1980). Experience seems to show that generating and sustaining a sense
of unity and solidarity requires ongoing cooperative relationships and conversations. The best known
examples of the kind of interfirm and intrafirm associations we are talking about involve the Japanese
Keiretsu and the Korean Chaebol. 4 The benefits found within these associations are now legendary,
and appear to have played a strong role in the phenomenal economic growth of the region:
The network functions like a living organism, excelling at producing products
quickly and cheaply. This is why Hong Kong has supplanted Italy as the
world's top producer of fashion goods. It is how tiny Taiwanese companies
run rings around giants in the personal-computer market (The Economist .
November 16th, 1991).
In our view the arguments that the Keiretsu and Chaebol economize on transaction costs and
overcome market imperfections (e.g., Chang & Choi, 1988; Leff, 1978) are accurate but incomplete.
Asian alliances have been in place over a much longer timeframe than most Western companies
4 Observers have pointed out that the basis for these two kinds of cooperation are somewhat different;
while some Keiretsu have their roots in long established trading companies, the Chaebol is more firmly rooted in
family connections (Oh, 1992). In domestic Chinese owned firms, a similar form of interfirm alliance is apparently
more closely linked to individual entrepreneurs (Komiya, 1987). The content of exchange also tends to differ. In
Japan, intergroup networks involve cross-shares, loans and joint ventures while in Korea coordination is primarily
through banks and government (Orru, Biggart & Hamilton, 1991).
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contemplate. They encompass a multifaceted context that is more complex than considered by most
Western firms. The result of this framework is that any given exchange is only a small part of the total
relationship, and the social context places a constraint on short-term, self-interested behavior. The basis
for sustaining interfirm cooperation is social connection among actors that goes beyond legal
connections, and recognition that this fabric exists over time (Granovetter, 1985).
Since these forms of alliance are tied to culture, it is foolish to think that Western firms can
directly adopt them. The way they function is nevertheless instructive. First, they show there are quite
different ways to establish a social context that control the human tendency to maximize self-gain.
Second, they illustrate a way of interacting in which the formal contract plays a supporting, rather than a
primary, role.
4) Moral criteria : We argue that the spirit of market capitalism is based on the invisible
institutions of altruism, ethics, goodwill, morality, and trust (Arrow, 1974; Dore, 1983; Nielsen, 1989),
and that the broader cohesion of the global economy, which mixes different forms of economic activity,
ultimately requires the same moral base. These invisible institutions are fragile and yet profoundly vital.
As Durkheim writes: "Altruism is not ... an agreeable ornament in social life, but it will forever be its
fundamental basis. How can we really dispense with it?" (1933, p. 228).
To understand the ethical basis of relationships, both time and connection must be taken into
account. In direct contradiction to the basic assumptions of classic economics, a new social contract
approach recognizes that:
1) one act has implications for other acts in the past and future,
2) any given action has implications for many actors (a theme shared by many who
have viewed Frank Capra's classic movie, It's a Wonderful Life).
3) action outcomes for others ultimately impinge upon the originator of the action.
These assumptions are much more complicated than the assumption of systematic self-serving behavior.
Decisions based on these assumptions must be more content specific; they will recognize the unique
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nature of the time and the actors involved in the exchange. While theory is thus made more
complicated, these assumptions allow the development of a social context that in turn makes it more
likely that individuals will make moral (socially serving) decisions.
The old golden rule "do unto others as you would have them do unto you" is not a sufficient
guide to moral behavior under the new social contract. The competent, healthy, forceful manager can be
lured into thinking "of course I could deal with this if it happened to me." The world in contrast is
peopled by a much more diverse set of actors - old and young, in various states of health and wealth,
with a consequently broader range of adaptive ability at any point in time.
The guiding principle of the new social contract can be expressed as a more socially connected
variant of the golden rule: do unto to others as one would do unto a loved member of one's own family.
The critical ethical stance is to abandon the "faceless" agent (Foucault, 1977). The new golden rule
shifts the locus of responsibility and the motivation for action -- it's not what "they" might do to me . but
what "I" want to do for those to whom I am related.
Expressing the new golden rule in family terms5 does not mean a return to paternalistic
management. In families, broadly conceived, no one is the patriarch forever. In these complex ties, we
have all been subordinate, we have all recognized our own need for sustenance. Evolving family
relations also hint at the enormity of the task before us in articulating the new social contract - for we
must admit that we do not always know what to do when interacting with those we love, and we must
admit that even in these closest connections we do not always have the will to do what we know we
should, or desist from doing what we know we should not do.
5) Participation in a new Dialogue : Recognizing our insufficient ability to generate new social
contracts requires that the firm become a nexus of ethical conversation. Maclntyre (1984) argues that
the language — and therefore to some large degree the practice ~ of morality today is in a state of grave
5 Raghu Garud is also working on the idea that useful guidelines for contractual relations can be expressed in
family terms.
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disorder; what is needed is a Schumpeterian innovator in the language of morality. As with all
innovative activity, sometimes a particular innovation will be a success, other times undesirable and
unforeseen consequences will emerge. The important thing is to recognize the need to bring together
very different perspectives on the most basic of human motives. The conversation should be unbounded,
diverse, undistorted, continuous and at times argumentative (Kahn, 1990; Rorty, 1979). For example, in
order to make ethics training effective in organizations, executives must insure that employees feel free
to question directives when ethical problems are encountered (Harrington, 1991).
Conversation can provide both the text and context (i.e., information and meaning) for achieving
reliable organizational learning and mutually satisfying interfirm and intrafirm transactions (Hurst,
1991). It can mediate the deep level assumptions and the surface-level behavioral manifestations of
organizational culture (Fiol, 1991) to construct a new sense of our rights and responsibilities as global
citizens. Most important, it reaffirms our unity with one another. The chemist and philosopher Polanyi
notes that:
the main reason for which people talk to each other is a desire for
company. The torment of solitary confinement is that it deprives one
not of information but of conversation, however uninformative. The
fostering of good fellowship within small groups of people ... is a direct
contribution to the fulfillment of man's purpose and duty as a social
being. But the process is also of practical use in making the joint
activities of the group more effective (1958, pp. 210-211).
Now we must recognize that the dynamic of "making the group more effective" goes far beyond "good
fellowship within small groups of people." Through conversation, we argue, we will more broadly
understand our common global fate, and begin to develop a convergent, moral sense of how we can
improve our common condition.
Nonseparability is the Solution, not the Problem
Arrow's central insight is that there is a moral and social basis to our contractual institutions.
An important corollary is that the individual can not be the central unit of economic analysis, even
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though it is imperative to sustain and nurture the individual morality that must inevitably confront
collective immorality (Niebuhr, 1960).
The key for developing the new social contract approach is Rousseau's: "with rights and
privileges come duties and responsibilities." At the heart of the tension between business and society is
the interpretation of what citizenship entails, particularly in the case of externally based transnational
corporations that operate too often as "free riders" in local social systems. At issue is whether
businesses are shirking their moral obligations as responsible citizens in the name of competition,
bargaining, and responsibility to stockholders, and whether individual decision makers are similarly
avoiding their duties and responsibilities in pursuing self interest.
Macneil goes right for the heart of agency theory by calling for the "death of principals". The
principal-agent view is attacked on two fronts. First, the narrow view of 'economic man' is called into
question because "everyone is a mix of selfish and social interests melding in kinship and other social
patterns precluding agency-principal differentiation ..." (Macneil, 1980, p. 80). Then, Macneil reminds
us that the world of organizations is multifaceted:
The constituency with the best claim in the Western world to being a principal
(the stockholder) is far from it. We . . . find ourselves in a world of agents of
contractual relations, rather than agents of principals, relations organized in
hierarchical, bureaucratic structures. The hierarchies are subject not to a single
constituency brooding over them, but to many constituencies interpenetrating the
hierarchy and bureaucracy at all levels (1980, p. 79).
Rather than calling for the death of principals, we respond to these observations by calling for
the recognition that agency theory and other neo-Hobbesian approaches have been defined far too
narrowly. What managers and stockholders have lost sight of is that society is the ultimate principal of
economic contracts . Agency theory has mis-specified the ultimate beneficiary of economic behavior, and
in the process has undermined the benefits of economic transactions.
Returning to the possibility that one of two men unloading a truck may shirk his responsibilities,
we observe that social interaction is more likely to be an efficient corrective than the elaborate
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contracting, diligent monitoring and hierarchical organizational forms recommended by agency theory.
The people doing the work are close enough to it to make reasonable judgements about realistic effort,
and they also have the greatest knowledge of the many reasons (clumsiness, illness, age, heartache,
hangover, etc.) why input may vary among workers. In many, though not all, collaborative efforts of
our experience, the promise of a sustained and productive working relationship with one's peers is a
more effective inducement to effort than legal promises and managerial oversight.
The new social contract approach, in short, directly contradicts agency theory prescriptions
(Arrow, 1985). Rather than seeing nonseparability as a problem, connections among individuals and
organizations become an intrinsic and necessary part of the social context that help generate moral
behavior. Because mutual dependence between exchange partners promotes trust (Shell, 1991), the
prescriptions to the strategist will often be exactly the opposite of those made by agency theorists. The
most important of these reversals is that possible opportunism from a new contract perspective is more
likely to be mitigated by establishing and emphasizing the links in time and space that bind people
together. As an important corollary, efforts to establish and maintain links among actors from the new
social contract perspective will not have the recurring costs associated with incentives, monitoring,
auditing, and dispute settling. Investments in the social context have benefits in the future, because they
make it more likely that moral acts will be followed by moral acts (Etzioni, 1988).
Conclusion
By operating with neo-Hobbesian assumptions to assure short-term gains, the firm undermines
the longer term benefits of alliance -- not only with other firms, but among its own employees.
Contracts that assume the other can not be trusted in the present are unlikely to lead to trust in the
future. Therefore attempts to constrain opportunism along the lines suggested by agency theory will
have continuing economic as well as human costs.
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We need a new contract perspective, and we need to explore the way in which these precepts are
incompatible with the dictates of neoclassical economics. The development of a new approach requires
an integration of law (Fuller, 1969; Macneil, 1980), economics (Arrow, 1974; McCloskey, 1985),
sociology (Durkheim, 1933; Swedborg, 1987) and organization theory (Eisenhardt, 1985; Etzioni, 1988;
Ouchi, 1980). Developing an integrative, interdisciplinary approach to strategic management research is
imperative if the field is to remain relevant to current and future managers. An interdisciplinary,
pluralistic approach is also arguably the best way forward for the intellectual development of the
academic field (Bowman, 1990; Huff, 1981; Jemison, 1981; Zajac, 1992).
The compelling reason to develop better understanding of social controls is Etzioni 's (1988)
argument that moral behavior supported by the social context is likely to beget further moral behavior.
The existence of trust gives one reason to trust. Trust builds optimism about others' behavior which can
lead to further gains based on mutual cooperation (Orbell & Dawes, 1991). Conversely, distrust begets
distrust (Banfield, 1958; Nussbaum, 1989).
In an essay entitled "The Green Fields of the Mind", Bart Giamatti (Renaissance scholar, former
President of Yale and former baseball commissioner) noted that "one of our deepest desires is to
conserve something of purpose in a world of confusion". We suggest that the vision of a new social
contract (Macneil, 1980) enables us to move beyond the neo-Hobbesian view of contract. By developing
new ideas about the contractual relationship, the contemporary business school academic and the modern
business executive may share similar dreams and hopes of developing and nurturing organic solidarity.
In some instances we may continue to view strategy in the narrow economic sense of "a continuing
search for rent" (Bowman, 1974, p. 47), but in loftier moments we should be persuaded that strategy is
also a continuing search for morally satisfying ways of interacting with other human beings.
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